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Real Property -CONDOMINIUMS
-DEVELOPER
SELF-DEALING
-Point
East Management Corp. v . Point East One Condominium Corp.,
282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 258 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).

A group of individuals developed a Florida condominium complex
composed of four separate condominium clusters, each with its own incorporated' owners association. While the developers owned all of the
condominium units and controlled the owners associations, they caused
the associations to enter into 25-year management contracts with a management corporation also controlled by the developers and a 99-year lease
of adjacent land owned by the developers for use as a common recreational
f a ~ i l i t y .When
~
the purchasers of the individual units later assumed control of the owners associations, they felt that the terms of the management
contracts and the lease were onerous and sued for their rescission. T h e
associations alleged that by engaging in self-dealing the developers had
breached fiduciary duties owed to unit purchasers, and asked that the
management contracts be declared void for containing provisions contrary to the intent of the Florida Condominium Act.3 T h e trial court
agreed that the management contracts were clearly in violation of the
intent of the Condominium Act because " [t] his delegation and abdication of responsibility and control exceeds the bounds of statutory authority and defeats the purposes of the Condominium Act."4 T h e trial court
declared the management contracts unlawful and void,5 but denied all
. ~ District Court ofAppeals affirmed per curiam,'
other relief s ~ u g h tThe
but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did
llncorporation of the owners association is authorized by FLA.STAT.ANN.5 7 11.12(1) (1969),
reproduced here at note 23 infra.
2The separate lease of recreational property was authorized by FLA.STAT.ANN.5 71 1.121
(1969), reproduced here at note 13 infra.
3 F ~STAT.
~ . ANN.9 711 (1969). The specific language relied upon by the associations in
Point East appears in section 71 1.12(1) ("The operation of the condominium shall be by the
association, the name of which shall be stated in the declaration.") and section 711.03(2)
("Association means the entity responsible for the operation of a condominium.").
4258So. 2d 322,324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
5Zd.
6The action in the trial court was actually a consolidation of three separate suits:
In one action the associations sued the management corporation seeking cancellation of the management contracts because of alleged breaches of contract; damages for
breach of contract; an accounting; and a determination that the management contracts
were void because against public policy and for failure to conform to the requirements
for such contracts as provided for in the Condominium Act [citation omitted] .
In a second action the associations sued the four individual developers seeking damages
for alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duties. The third action was by the associations
against the four individual defendants, for cancellation of the.. . lease, of which said
defendants were the lessors.
Id. at 323-34.
' I d . at 324.
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not intend to restrict the power of the associations to contract for the
management of condominium properties, and adding that management
contracts should not be declared invalid solely because the developers
had contracted with themselves.8

In recent years, condominiumsg have proliferated as an alternative t~
the single family dwelling.'() A condominium purchaser buys not only
his own unit,ll but also an undivided interest in common elements.l?
T h e common elements are typically maintained by a unit owners association, and the costs of improving and maintaining them are generally
shared by the unit owners through payment of a required monthly assessment.
These common ownership arrangements, foreign to most purchasers
of single family homes, have been used to disguise developer compensation not reflected in the purchase price of the unit, but passed to the
buyer through monthly assessments. For example, the developer will
sometimes sell or lease recreational facilities to the association, rather
than making them a part of the common elements included in the pur8282 So. 2d 628,630 (Fla. 1973).
9Condominiums are generally creatures of statutory law. State enabling acts were passed
in response to section 234 of the National Housing Act, which authorized FHA insurance on
individual condominium unit mortgages, where recognized by state law. National Housing
Act 5 234, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962). See also, Legislation Note, Condominium- A Comparative Analysis of Condominium Statutes, 13 DE PAULL. &v. 111 (1963).
'OFigures released by the Department of Housing and Urban Development indicate that
during 1973 construction was started on approximately 241,000 condominium units, representing roughly 29 percent of all private starts of housing for sale in the United States.
Nearly half of the unit starts reported by HUD were in the South, principally in Florida.
Lines 6.Numbers, HUD CHALLENGE,
January 1975, at 33. A 1972 HUD study revealed that in
that year condominiums constituted 40.3 percent of new housing units completed for sale, and
49 percent of all housing units under construction, in 25 selected metropolitan areas. NAHB
JOURNAL-SCOPE,
November 5, 1973, at 47. Although much of the early condominium growth
was in the vacation or second home market, current inflationary trends are pricing the single
family dwelling out of the reach of many would-be home owners. T h e condominium offers
most of the incidents of home ownership, often at a significantly lower cost per square foot.
LAW AND PRACTICEat Intro-1
See Introduction to 1 P. ROHAN& M. RESKIN,CONDOMINIUM
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN& RESKIN]
; Berger, Condominium: Shelter On A Statutory
Foundation, 63 COLUM.L. REV. 987 (1963); Seeber, Condominiums in North Carolina: Improving The Statutory Base, 7 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 355, 356 (1971); Comment, Condominium: An Introduction T o The Horizontal Property System, 11 DE PAULL. REV. 319,
321 (1962).
"There is some disagreement as to whether the "unit" owned in fee simple by the purchaser
consists of the floor, ceiling, and walls surrounding the unit or only the air space enclosed
& RESKIN
5 1.01 [2] .
therein. 1 ROHAN
12Essentially, the "common elements" include everything in the condominium complex not
owned in fee simple by the unit purchaser; areas for the use of all unit owners ("general cornmon elements") and areas for the use of more than one but less than all unit owners ("limited
& RESKIN
5 6.01.
common elements"). 1 ROHAN
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chase price of a unit.l3 Perhaps the most important opportunity for the
developer to increase his undisclosed profits on a condominium project
results from the fact that until there are a sufficient number of unit owners to assume control of the owners association and elect their own managing board,14 the developer controls the association.l5 During this
interim period, the developer may engage in self-dealing by executing
contracts on behalf of the owners association with developer-owned or
affiliated companies on terms far less favorable to the prospective unit
owners than would have resulted from arms-length transactions.l6 I n
this way, the developer can obtain an inflated price for recreational
property,l? or assure himself of continuing profits of as much as 300 peror he may hire his own
cent per year by leasing it at an excessive rentalY18
IsFlorida's Condominium Act, for example, specifically provides that the owners association may obtain an interest in recreational property apart from that which is actually submitted to condominium:
In addition to any other provisions of this chapter, an association may acquire and enter
into agreements whereby it acquires leaseholds, memberships and other possessory or use
interests in lands or facilities including but not limited to country clubs, golf courses,
marinas and other recreational facilities, whether or not contiguous to the lands of the
condominium, intended to provide for the enjoyment, recreation or other use or benefit
of the unit owners.
FLA.STAT.ANN.5 71 1.121 (1969).
l4The managing board is the governing body for the owners association, and assumes the
basic responsibility for management and maintenance of the condominium. Where the
condominium project is a large one, the board may delegate the day-to-day duties and decisionmaking authority to a professional management company. For a discussion in connection with
the Point East case of the extent of the owners association's power to delegate management
duties see Note, Long Term Management Contracts Between Condominium Associations and
Developer-Controlled Management Corporations Held Not Violative of The Florida Condominium Act, 28 U . MIAMIL. h v . 451,456 (1974).
l5State condominium acts do not specify when the unit owners are entitled to assume control
of the owners association. Rohan and Reskin suggest that the declaration or bylaws of a
condominium commonly provide that the initial meeting is to be called by the developer any
time after at least 51 percent of the units are occupied, but not later than the final occupancy
5 17.02, at 17-3. Some developers take advantage of the
of all the units. 1 ROHAN& RESKIN
general uncertainty and hang on as long as possible. A Florida commission investigating condominium problems in that state heard several such complaints. Note, Legal Protection For
Florida Condominium and Cooperative Buyers and Owners, 27 U . MIAMIL. REV.451, 455
(1973).
'GSee, e.g., note 18 infra and accompanying text.
''The developer may reap unconscionable, though undisclosed, profits by conspiring with
a third party. For example, he may buy the property at a price far in excess of fair market
value, and then sell it to the association at an apparently reasonable profit. He derives an
unfair profit by receiving a secret rebate from the third-party seller. For discussion of this
sort of "flip sale" in connection with the purchase of condominium or cooperative property
L.
see Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and The Federal Securities Laws, 71 COLUM.
REV.118, 120 (1971).
'*The Attorney General of Florida has recently stated that developers investing as little as
$2 million in recreational facilities typically reap unconscionable profits of between $3 million and $6 million annually, theoretically for as long as 99 years. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1974, at
1, col. 4.
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management company to maintain and manage the common areas.19 T o
date, Florida cases are the only reported decisions on the issue of whether
the unit owners, when they assume control of their owners association,
can be bound by such agreements.
T h e first condominium developer self-dealing case in Florida was
Fountainuiew Association, Znc., No. 4 u. Be1L20 In that case, the developers, while serving as the sole officers of the owners a s s ~ c i a t i o n indi,~~
vidually conveyed or leased land to the associations on allegedly inflated
terms and entered into third-party management contracts at allegedly
exorbitant fees.22 When the unit purchasers later assumed control of the
associations, organized by the developers as nonprofit ~orporations,~3
they caused the associations to bring a suit to recover the excessive profits
and fees. The court interpreted the Florida Condominium Act24 to
mean that such associations are to be governed by the law applicable to
private corporations for profit and ruled against the associations, holding
that a 1930 Florida case, Lake Mabel Deuelopment Corp. u. Bird,25 was
dispositive.26 According to the Fountainuiew majority, Lake Mabel held
that a sale of property to a corporation by its promoters, while they still
held all of its outstanding stock, could not later be avoided by the corporation, because the corporation had full knowledge of the facts at the time
of the sale and the rights of prospective purchasers had not yet-arisen.
T h e Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Fountainuiew decision per
~uriam.~7
Since Fountainuiew, the Florida courts have consistently refused to
invalidate the actions of self-dealing developers. In Wechsler u. GoldIgThe developer may hire a subsidiary to manage the condominium, or an affiliated management company, or he may receive a kickback for awarding the management contract to a
third-party management company. Note, Florida Condominiums -Developer Abuses and
Securities Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U . FLA.L. REV.
350,353 (1973).
20203SO.2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), a f f d per curium, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
21As in the Point East case, the project was organized as several separate condominiums, each
with its own association. In Fountainview, only associations No. 4 and No. 5 were joined as
plaintiffs. Id.
221d.at 658.
23The Florida Condominium Act provides that:
T h e declaration may require the association to be organized as a particular entity, such
as but not limited to a corporation for profit or corporation not for profit, in which the
owners of units shall be stockholders or members.
FLA.STAT.ANN.5 71 1.12(1) (1969) (emphasis added).
241d.;203 So. 2d at 659.
2599 Fla. 253,126 So. 356 (1930).
26203SO.2d at 659.
27FountainviewAssociation, Inc., No. 4 v. Bell, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968). Before Fountainview, authorities had suggested that the choice of a corporate form of owners association would
have no legal consequences. H. Kane 8- W. Helms, The Illinois Condominium Property Act,
2 U . ILL.L.F. 157.175 (1970).
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man28 the developers were the sole directors of a corporation which leased
communal recreational facilities to an owners association which they also
controlled. Although the annual rental was greater than the assessed
value of the property, the court upheld the validity of the lease, citing
Fountainview and adding that there had been adequate disclosure to the
purchasers at closing,29 notwithstanding the fact that they had not been
advised of the lease when they were initially solicited or at the time they
signed preliminary contracts. The court acknowledged its reluctance to
deny relief from the lease, and suggested that the facts in Wechsler and
Fountainview indicated a need for legislative amendment of the Con~
in Riviera
dominium Act to prevent future developer a b ~ s e s . 3Similarly,
Condominium Apartments, Inc., v . Weinberger,3l the court denied relief to the plaintiff owners association, but reiterated the call for legislative reform.

The district court32 decision in Point East appeared to be a reversal
of the previous Florida pattern of refusal to invalidate condominium developer self-dealing. The court declared invalid contracts
made or caused to be made by the original owners or developers of a
condominium between the condominium association and a manager or
management corporation, which [operate] to divest from the association
in a material or substantial degree the power and privilege granted it by
the statute to operate the condominium.33

The court emphasized that the Fountainview and Riviera cases were distinguishable from the Point East decision in that they turned on the
validity of developer self-dealing per se, while Point East did not. Instead, the Point E a t trial court examined the express language of the
Condominium Act and concluded that an owners association, regardless
of who controlled it, could legally enter into a management contract, but
only to the extent that it was not thereby substantially or materially
divested of control over the management of the condominium. T h e
28214SO.2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
29At closing, all but one of the purchasers individually agreed in their closing contracts to
be guarantors of the lease. Id. at 742.
3OZd. at 744.
3l231 SO. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). In Riviera, the developers, while acting as
directors of the incorporated owners association as well as directors of the corporation providing management and maintenance services, made an allegedly excessive payment of $7500
for management services from the association to the management company only two weeks
before turning over control to the unit owners. Noting that services had been rendered and
that purchasers knew of the payment before they bought, the court upheld the payment
citing Wechsler and Fountainview.
32This was the same District Court of Appeals that had denied relief to the plantiff associations in Fountainview, Wechsler, and Riviera.
33258 SO.2d at 325.
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specific evil which the trial court seized upon in Point East was excessive
delegation of the authority to manage, not self-dealing on the part of the
developers.34 This interpretation of statutory language was limited to
the management contract, however. The district court admitted that the
lease contained provisions which might motivate a court of equity to
grant relief, but citing Wec hsler, found it valid.35
The Florida Supreme Court reexamined the language of the Condominium Act relied upon by the district court and concluded that the
legislature, recognizing the magnitude of the maintenance and management tasks in a large condominium complex, had not intended to restrict
the ability of condominium owners associations to contract for management services.36 Neither the degree of delegation nor the long duration
of the Point East management contracts were found to make them objectionable. Further, the court concluded that the fact that the contract was
entered into by the developers, dealing with themselves, rather than by
associations controlled by the unit owners, did not invalidate it, citing
Lake Mabe1.37 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Ervin argued that the Lake
Mabel decision was irrelevant because the district court decision in Point
East rested almost exclusively on the court's interpretation of the Condominium Act.38

A . Judicial Relief from Condominium Developer Self-dealing
Although a few commentators have suggested that the Florida cases
upholding condominium developer self-dealingare contrary to the trend
34The court was probably attempting to reach the equities involved by using a theory more
consistent with the rationale of the prior self-dealing cases, rather than directly overruling
them. One commentator has recently suggested that the trial court result in Point East could
be reached by applying corporate doctrines limiting the power of a corporation's board of
directors to delegate their duty to manage the corporation. Note, Long Term Management
Contracts Between Condominium Associations and Developer-Controlled Management Corporations Held Not Violative of the Florida Condominium Act, 28 U . MIAMI L. REV.451,
456 (1974). Of course, this theory and the statutory interpretation approach used by the
Point East trial court are both of limited value to owners associations in that they are only
applicable to management contracts, leaving onerous leases and other self-dealing contracts
untouched.
35258 SO.2d at 326.
36Point East Management Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628
(Fla. 1973).
371d. at 630.
38Id. (dissenting opinion). The Point East plaintiff associations subsequently brought
suit in Federal Court based upon an antitrust tie-in theory.
T h e defendants, on the eve of a jury trial in which they were facing treble damages as to
fees received under the Management Agreements terminated the Agreements in full
settlement of all claims and thereby released the four Plaintiff Associations from any
liability under the remaining 17 years of the Agreements.
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in the majority of jurisdi~tions,3~
there have been no condominium developer self-dealingcases reported outside Florida. This lack of case law
is partly due to the fact that other states are only now beginning to experience the rapid growth in condominium development which has
characterized the Miami area for a number of years. Many other states,
however, permit incorporation of the owners association, either expressly
in the condominium act or impliedly by making no reference to the form
of organization to be used. There is some danger that those states will
choose to follow the Florida cases or may be influenced to reach the same
result by applying their own comparable principles of corporation law.
Although there are no cases outside Florida on the problem of condominium developer self-dealing, there were several New York cases in the
1950s involving self-dealing on the part of sponsors of cooperative housing projects.40 The New York courts held that sponsors owed a measure
of fiduciary duty to purchasers, and the original Fountainview plaintiffs
sought to draw support fi-om those decision^.^' T h e Fountainview court
ignored the New York cases, however, reasoning that Fountainview was
not a case of first impression in Florida and relying instead on Lake
MabeLQ The New York courts had concluded that a self-dealing cooperative sponsor could be held to strict fiduciary standards only for selfdealing transactions which occurred after sales to the public had b e g ~ n . ~ 3
As to self-dealing occurring prior to any such sales, the sponsor was held
only to a duty to disclose the resulting contracts to the unit buyers."
Letter from Gerald F. Richman, counsel for plaintiff associations, to James E. Gleason, Jr.,
October 23, 1974, on file in the Brigham Young University Law Review.
39Note, Florida Condominiums -Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create
a Need For a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA.L. REV.350, 355 (1973); Note, Real Property - Georgia's Apartment Ownership Act -Its Scope Analyzed in View of Emerging
L. REV.405, 41 1 (1972); COOPERATIVES
AND CONLitigation in Other Jurisdictions, 23 MERCER
DOMINIUMS 17 (J. McCord ed. 1968); see also Justice Ervin's dissent from the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion in Point East, 282 So. 2d at 634.
40The leading case was Northridge Co-op. Section No. 1, Inc. v. 32nd Ave. Constr. Corp.,
207 Misc. 164, 136 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 286 App. Div. 422, 142 N.Y.S.2d
534 (1955), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 514, 161 NY.S.2d 404, 141 N.E.2d 802 (1957). For other cases
and discussion see Note, Federal Assistance In Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALEL.J. 542, 586 & n.281 (1959). For discussion comparing condominiums to coAND K. STECHER,
LAWOF
operative apartments see 1 ROHANAND RESKIN§ 1.01 [2] ; 1 A. FERRER
CONDOMINIUM
$ 10 (1967); Comment, Practical Guide to Condominium Law in Connecticut,
4 CONN.L. REV.669,673-76 (1972); Comment, FHA Condominium: A Basic Comparison W i t h
the FHA Cooperative, 31 GEO.WASH.L. REV.1014 (1963).
4lFountainview Ass'n, Inc., No. 4 v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
a f f d per curium, 214 SO.2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
421d.;see note 25 supra and accompanying text.
43See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
44At least one cooperative case interpreted the sponsor's duty of disclosure to extend not
only to the terms of contracts entered into, but specifically to the dual position occupied by
the sponsor-director. Clearview Gardens First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Corp. v. Weisman,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 1957, p. 1 1, col. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
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Accordingly, a New York sponsor could easily enter into binding contracts with himself, covering sales or leases of land, maintenance, man, ~ ~ to making the first sale. Thus, the
agement, or even c o n ~ t r u c t i o nprior
cooperative sponsor's duty was not actually fiduciary in nature but was
effectively limited to disclosure in a manner somewhat analogous to the
application of corporation law principles relied on by the Florida courts
in the condominium cases. The fact that the New York courts, when confronted with equities similar to those involved in the Florida condominium cases, also denied relief to purchasers underscores the possibility
that courts in other jurisdictions will determine that relief from condominium developer self-dealing is unavailable under existing corporate
and condominium law.
T h e Florida cases, and the New York decisions before them, rest in
part on the finding in each instance that the allegedly onerous contracts
had been "disclosed" to the prospective purchasers prior to sale, implying
that those who bought knew what they were getting into and should not
later be heard to complain. However, the adequacy of the disclosure
commonly provided in the homebuilding industry is open to q ~ e s t i o n . ~ 6
The "notice" received by the average purchaser from the voluminous
and highly technical contracts of sale4?and supporting documentation is
often only a legal fiction. Even if the prospective purchaser reads the
documentation, he frequently lacks the expertise necessary to assess the
reasonableness of the reported costs and estimates of future costs,48 and
is often unwilling to pay for expert advice. Further, a tight housing
market may pressure him into overlooking unfavorable terms that he
might otherwise question.49 Finally, the selection of a personal residence
is not purely an objective investment decision, but involves elements of
emotion, personal taste, etc.
The above factors call into question the application of older corporation law cases, such as Lake Mabel, in the context of condominium de-

450ne reason the doctrine established by the New York courts was thought viable was that
under FHA rules, the actual construction of a cooperative could not begin until its stock was
90 percent subscribed. Unfortunately, that rule did not preclude entering into binding construction contracts in advance. Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALEL.J. 542,586-87 (1959).
46Zd.at 587; Wash. Post, July 6, 1974, at Dl, col. 1.
47The sales contract itself may run more than 100 pages. Wash. Post, July 6, 1974, at Dl,
col. 1.
48Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE
L.J. 542, 587 and n.290 (1959); Comment, Condominiums in Virginia - The Condominium
Act of l!V4,9 U. RICHMOND
L. REV.135, at 146 & n.107 (1974).
49The New York courts have refused to be influenced by the problems associated with a
tight housing market. In some of the cooperative cases, the courts recognized the existence of
a housing shortage, but refused to give it special weight in assessing the developer's fiduciary
duty. Nostrand Gardens, Inc. v. Roche, N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1958, p. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957);
Northridge Co-op. Section No. 1, Inc. v. 32nd Ave. Constr. Corp., 286 App. Div. 422, 434, 142
N.Y.S.2d 534,546 (1955) (dissenting opinion).

2951

CASE NOTES

303

veloper self-dealing.50Since 1930, when Lake Mabel was decided, both
the federal government and the states have recognized a need to impose
more stringent disclosure standards on corporate promoters, and have
enacted federal securities acts and state "blue sky" laws. T h e Florida
courts, by reaching back to Lake Ma be1 for corporation law precedent,51
have seized upon a disclosure standard which has long since been recognized as inadequate in the corporation law context and is even less appropriate in the condominium field. Until stringent statutory disclosure
standards are imposed in the condominium field, the courts should avoid
Florida's inappropriate application of out-dated corporation law and
exercise their equity powers to grant relief where disclosure has actually
been inadequate.

B. Legislative Action To Curb Developer Self-Dealing
If the Florida and New York cases are any indication of the approach
that courts in other jurisdictions are likely to take in future self-dealing
cases, the responsibility for providing adequate protection for condominium buyers will ultimately fall on the legislatures. T h e threshold
policy issue is the extent to which condominium purchasers should be
protected, not only from self-dealing developers, but from themselves.
The available policy alternatives range from parens patriae to caveat
emptor.
1 . Supervision by a state administrative agency. Just as many "blue
sky" laws regulating the offering and sale of securities provide that an
offering must pass a state "merit'' review, a state legislature could empower an administrative agency to police condominium offerings. Such
an approach has a predecessor in FHA regulation of cooperative housing
projects in the 1 9 5 0 ~ . ~ ~
Because most of the postwar cooperatives were FHA insured,53 the
FHA used its approval power over applications for mortgage insurance to
implement rules designed to curb developers' self-dealing abuses.54
For example, whenever an "identity of interest" existed between the cooperative corporation and the general contractor, a cost-plus-fixed-fee
construction contract was required.55 Additionally, any such builderSosee, e.g., Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908);
Lake lMabel Dev. Corp. v. Bird, 99 Fla. 253, 126 So. 2d 356 (1930).
51See text accompanying note 25 supra.
52Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE
L.J. 542,588-92 (1959).
53National Housing Act 5 213, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962).
54Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE
L.J. 542,588-89 (1959).
551d. at 588 & n.296. Of course, the restraining power of the regulation was dependent
upon how broadly "identity of interest" was construed.
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sponsor was required to employ an independent attorney who represented
the future purchasers during contract negotiations and to appoint an independent board of directors to serve until the purchasers could elect
their 0wn.56
T h e FHA has similar power to regulate condominium developers
under the section 234 condominium mortgage insurance program.57
However, because relatively few condominium developers currently seek
FHA approva1758FHA regulation is largely ineffective.
A similar administrative approach could be adapted for use at the
state level, however, and one writer has suggested legislative creation of
a state condominium agency as a solution to Florida's condominium
problems.59 Several states already require condominium developers to
submit their declarations and other documentation to an existing state
commission to assure that they meet the requirements of the state's condominium act prior to any public offering.60 The commissions are frequently empowered to inspect projects prior to approval.61 Once the
developer has secured approval, no changes may be made in the approved documents without the consent of the state commission. The
authority of such commissions could be expanded beyond assuring
accurate disclosure to policing the reasonableness of the offering. Where
volume demanded it, the function could be shifted to a separate condominium agency. Such an administrative approach at the state level
would afford wide-ranging protection to condominium purchasers without requiring them to seek redress in the courts.
2. Total revision of the state condominium statute. Active policing
of condominium offerings by a state agency naturally requires considerable continuing state involvement. In states where condominium abuses
-

-

56The "independence" of any developer-appointed attorney seems highly questionable. Id.
at 588.
57National Housing Act 5 234, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962). The FHA has developed model
condominium organizational documents which it requires developers to follow "with only
such changes as may be required to conform to the facts pertaining to the individual project or
CONDOMINIUM
HOUSING
INto requirements of local law" (FEDERAL
HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION,
SURANCE AND SERVICING
HANDBOOK,
FHA MANUAL,
Vo1. VI, Book 2, Part B, Appendix V-4
5 4.2). See, e.g., 1 ROHAN& RESKIN5 9.04 [7] for an explanation of FHA Form No. 3281, the
model management agreement.
58HUD figures indicate that in 1973, of 241,000 condominium units started, only 9,785 units
January 1975, at 33. See also
were HUDIFHA insured. Lines 6.Numbers, HUD CHALLENGE,
Vishney, Financing the Condominium, 1970 U . ILL. L.F. 181, 182-83 (1970). Ironically, the
availability of FHA insurance on individual condominium units precipitated the enactment of
the state condominium acts. Note 9 supra.
59Note, Florida Condominiums -Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create
a Need For a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA.L. h v . 350,365 (1973).
Gosee,e.g., HAWAII
REV. LAWS5 514-15 (1968); MICH.COMP.LAWSANN.$5 559.23-.27 (1967);
VA. CODEANN.$5 55-79.16 to -79.21 (1974); WASH.h v . CODEANN.5 64.32.100 (1965) (in Washington, the documents are submitted to the county auditor).
61See,e.g., HAWAII
REV.LAWS5 514-31 (1968).
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are not extensive, a less expensive alternative would be a thorough review
and overhaul, if necessary, of the state's condominium act. When FHA
mortgage insurance was authorized for individual loans on condominium
units in 1962, the states scrambled to respond with condominium en~~
these early condominium statutes were
abling l e g i ~ l a t i o n .Typically,
poorly drafted and are inadequate to cope with developer abuses, including self-dealing,which were not foreseen when the statutes were enacted.
While Virginia and Florida have created special commissions to thoroughly examine their condominium acts, most states have not adequately
updated their statutes.63 As the inadequacies of these acts become increasingly apparent, states should modify their statutes accordingly.
3. Statutory imposition o f developer fiduciary duties. Although
the Florida courts refused to recognize the plaintiff associations' claim
that the developers owed a fiduciary duty to purchasers, one specific
remedy for developer self-dealingwould be to identify those duties in the
condominium act itself. So far, such provisions in the condominium acts
have been limited to prohibiting misrepresentation in promotional
materials or official documentation.64 Given the inadequate disclosure
standards in the condominium field, unscrupulous promoters need not
resort to outright misrepresentation to reap exorbitant profits from selfdealing. Statutorily imposed fiduciary standards should be broader and
directed at self-dealing transactions occurring at any t i m e during the
development of a condominium project.
After identifying the developer's fiduciary obligations, the statute
should broaden remedies available to aggrieved purchasers and associations for violation of those duties. Presently, the only remedy available
under the misrepresentation statutes is rescission of the contract of sale.65
Yet in most instances, the condominium buyer has purchased his unit
because he wants to live in it. Especially where he has moved his family
and possessions in, his interest may not be best served by rescission. A
more appropriate remedy might be invalidation of onerous management
contracts, leases, and other agreements arising out of developer self-dealing, and an accounting for and recovery of excessive amounts already
paid by purchasers.
4. Statutory restrictions o n management contracts. Another approach to upgrading condominium statutes would be to place statutory
restrictions on management contracts. For example, in 1973, the Vir62National Housing Act 5 234, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962).
Wee, e.g., notes 64,66,67 & 69 infra and accompanying text.
64See,e.g., HAWAII
REV.LAWS5 514-45 (1968); MICH.COMP.LAWSANN.5 559.28 (1967); VA.
CODEANN.5 55-79.28 (1974).
REV.LAWS5 514-47 (1972). Developers found guilty of misrepresenta65See, e.g., HAWAII
tion are also subject to criminal penalties: HAWAII
REV.LAWS5 514-46 (1968); MICH.COMP.
LAWSANN.5 559.28 (1967); VA.CODEANN.$55-79.28 (1962).
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ginia legislature amended the state's condominium act to limit developercreated management contracts to five years.66 Such a provision does
nothing, however, to limit onerous covenants in the contracts, such as
authority to make major expenditures for repairs from association funds
without association approval. Florida has provided a broader remedy
by making any original management or maintenance contract subject to
cancellation upon a 75 percent vote of the association members67 any
In Calitime after the unit owners assume control of the ass~ciation.~g
fornia, where condominiums are regulated for some purposes by the
Real Estate Commission, a 51 percent vote of the unit owners will suffice." Even these remedies, however, reach only management contracts.
Similar remedies should be extended to leases or sales of recreational
facilities, and other contractual arrangements arising out of developer
self-dealing.
5 . Imposition of more stringent disclosure standards. Finally, those
legislatures that prefer to stay closer to the caveat emptor philosophy
should at least develop or strengthen disclosure standards in the condominium field. Disclosure should be simple and brief enough that the
average purchaser, without benefit of counsel, will not be discouraged
from reading it, yet clear and complete enough that he will be warned of
potential pitfalls. For example, adequate disclosure is increasingly being
compelled by statutes and administrative decisions which treat condominium offerings involving rental pool arrangements or other profit incentives as investment contracts or securities, and require registration
and disclosure under the securities laws.70 Another example is the state
requirement of a separate short-form statement, containing prescribed
W A . CODE
ANN.5 55-79.21:2 (1974).
6 7 F ~STAT.
~ . ANN.5 711.13(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974-75), repealed, Ch. 74-104, 8 8 [I9741 1
Laws of Fla. 2d Reg. Sess. 163, 172, reenacted in substance as 711.66(5),Ch. 74-104,s 16 [1974]
1 Laws of Fla. 2d Reg. Sess. 163, 190. Justice Ervin, in his dissent in the Point East case,
points out that the existence of this 75 percent rule at the time the Point East case arose did not
render the plaintiff associations remediless in that litigation because the management contracts involved there were entered into prior to the effective date of that legislation (282 So.
2d 628, at 633).
68There is some dispute over when the unit purchasers are entitled to take over. If as Rohan
and Reskin suggest, 1 ROHAN& &SKIN § 17.02, at 17-3, it is any time after 51 percent of the
units are owner occupied, the Florida 75 percent rule (note 67 supra) could be invoked by as
little as 39 percent of the eventual total membership of the association.
Walifornia's 51 percent rule is an administrative regulation promulgated by the Real Estate
Commissioner. 10 CALIF.ADMIN.CODE 2792.8(18)(a) at 4023 (1971).
7OFor fuller discussion of the characteristics that have caused some condominium offerings
to be construed as securities see 1A ROHANAND RESKIN$ 18; Clurman, Condominiums A s
Securities: A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974); R. Dickey & B. Thorpe, Federal Securities
Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's ~e'rspective,62 GEO.L.J. 1403 (1974); Ellsworth,
Condominiums Are Securities?, 2 REALESTATEL.J. 694 (1974); Comment, Securities: Another
Way to Regulate the Resort Development Boom, 27 OKLA.L. REV. 104 (1974); Comment,
Securities Regulation of Condominium offerings, 51 CHI-KENT
L. REV.148 (1974).
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information and warnings.71 If the burden is to be left on the buyer to
protect himself against developer fraud, more stringent disclosure standards can at least provide him with more accurate and complete information on which to base his judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
That self-dealing abuse by condominium developers has become a
serious problem is evidenced by recent action at both the state and federal
levels.T2 In the absence of federal regulatory action, the burden remains
on the states to protect the unsuspecting condominium buyer, not only
from misrepresentation, but from readily disguised self-dealing abuses
as well. The Point East and other Florida cases, and the New York cooperative decisions before them, suggest that the courts may fail to provide such protection. The state legislatures should therefore determine
7lFlorida1snewly revamped Condominium Act, in addition to setting forth in considerable
detail the items of information which must be included in the developer's prospectus or offering circular, requires that the purchaser be provided a statement entitled "Important Matters
T o Be Considered In Acquiring A Condominion Unit," containing prescribed bold-faced
warnings about recreational leases, management contracts, and several other potential hazards, where applicable to the particular offering. The new Florida act also requires that any
contract for the sale or lease of a condominium unit by a developer must contain a caveat in
bold-faced type to the effect that oral representations by the developer cannot be relied upon
and that the buyer should refer to the contract and required documents. Ch. 74-104, [I9741 1
Laws of Fla. 2d Reg. Sess. 163, 193. The changes suggested by the Florida condominium commission are discussed in Comment, Legal Protection For Florida Condominium and Cooperative Buyers and Owners, 27 U. MIAMIL. REV.451 (1973).
Virginia has also revised its condominium act in an effort to afford the purchaser a full and
fair disclosure comparable to that required under the federal securities regulation acts. VA.
CODEANN.55 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Cum. Supp. 1974). T h e Virginia act requires an elaborate
public offering statement, to be delivered to the purchaser either 10 days before the signing
of the contract, or on the contract date provided the purchaser is given 10 days in which to
cancel. T h e Virginia Real Estate Commission is given broad powers of enforcement under
the Act's disclosure requirenents, including imposition of criminal penalties of up to 6 months
imprisonment and/or $50,000 in fines for each offense. The amended Virginia Condominium
Act is discussed in Comment, Condominiums in Virginia - The Condominium Act of 1974,
9 U . RICHMOND
L. REV.135 (1974).
In Hawaii, the Real Estate Commission not only inspects the brochures, declarations, bylaws, and other documents associated with each condominium offering, but prepares its own
report to be distributed to each potential purchaser, containing clear warnings about any
self-dealing transactions the developer has entered into as well as comparisons of the project's
costs and cost estimates with averages for comparable projects. T h e developer may not enter
into a binding sales contract until the prospective purchaser has read and executed a receipt
REV.LAWS5 514-41 (1968). If
for the real estate commissioner's final public report. HAWAII
subsequent circumstances occur which would render the final public report misleading to
purchasers, the developer must stop all sales until a supplementary public report describing
5 514-42 (1968).
all changes has been issued. HAWAII
REV.LAWS
72The state of Florida has filed a test case against one of its biggest condominium developers,
charging that an onerous recreatiohal facilities lease amounts to an illegal restraint on trade
in violation of a Florida statute patterned after the Federal Trade Commission Act. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 4. The FTC has itself undertaken a wide-ranging investigation
of the condominium industry, stemming from a preliminary investigation of Florida abuses.
Wash. Post, July 6, 1974, at Dl, col. 1.
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as a matter of policy the extent to which they will protect condominium
purchasers and then implement that policy through revisions of their
condominium acts.
44(d) OF THE LANHAM
ACT-USE IN COMTrademarks AECTION
MERCE BY THE FOREIGN
APPLICANT
AS A PREREQUISITE
TO SECURING
A
UNITEDSTATES
TRADEMARK
REGISTRATION
-John Lecroy 6 Son, Znc.
v . Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F . Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132 (D.D.C. 1974).
During the past 25 years, patent tribunals have alternated between two
conflicting positions as to the requirements for foreign applicants seeking
United States trademark registrations. John Lecroy & Son, Inc. a.
Langis Foods Ltd.' was hailed as an opportunity for a judicial tribunal to
confront this administrative confusion squarely and settle the matter.
Instead, the court chose to cast aside the alternatives offered by previous
administrative decisions and to forge a third position. Thus, the conclusion of the court, rather than dousing the fires of confusion, has only
served to fuel them.
Langis Foods Limited (Langis), a Canadian corporation, filed application in Canada on March 28, 1969, to register the trademark "Lemon
Tree."2 At this time Langis had not used this mark in either Canada or
the United States.3 By September 19, 1969, the date it filed application
for registration of Lemon Tree in the United States, Langis had begun
using the mark in Canada. As Langis had still not used the mark in the
United States, it stated a claim of priority under section 44(d) of the
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)4 which would have given Langis
an effective application date of March 28, 1969, the filing date of its
Canadian application.
During the interval between Langis' Canadian and United States
filing dates, John Lecroy & Son, Inc. (Lecroy), a United States corporation, commenced using the trademark Lemon Tree in the United States,
'John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F. Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 192,64 TRADEMARKREP.301 (D.D.C. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom. SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., NO.
74-1841, D. C. Cir., August 26, 1974.
2The trademark "Lemon Tree" is for use in conjuction with dry crystals which when mixed
with water create lemonade. Id. at 964, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 133,64 TRADE-MARK
REP.at 302.
sunlike the law in the United States, Canadian law permits an applicant to file for registration of a "proposed trademark before the mark has actually been used. However, registration is granted only if use of the trademark is commenced within 6 months of the date of the
intial filing. In fact, of the more than 70 nations subscribing to the International Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, no more than
three require use prior to the filing of an application. John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods
Ltd., 177 U.S.P.Q. 717, 64 TRADE-MARK
REP. 308 (T.T.A.B. 1973), vacated, 376 F. Supp.
REP. 301 (D.D.C. 1974),appeal docketed sub n o m . SCM
962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132,64 TRADE-MARK
Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., No. 74-1841, D.C. Cir., August 26, 1974.
4Lanham Act 5 44(d), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(d) (1970).

